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Abstract: There is a considerable amount of literature analyzing factors of success 
in music contests, in particular those where the audience votes for the winner. 
However, one factor that is highlighted by the economic theory of stardom is gen-
erally neglected in the literature. In this paper, we tackle this research gap by focus-
ing on a national music contest in Germany and investigating how popularity of 
the participating artists influences the final voting results. We employ two different 
concepts of popularity. First, we collected data regarding the artist’s former success 
(MacDonald-popularity) using music charts data. Second, we proxy the media pres-
ence of the artists (Adler-popularity) using hits in traditional and new media. In our 
analysis, we find empirical evidence that the artist’s ex-ante popularity positively 
affects the outcome of voting results. Interestingly, media presence matters more 
than former success. Furthermore, displaying the characteristics of a one-hit won-
der harms success in the contest. 
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1. Introduction 
Music contests enjoy considerable relevance as means for detecting new talent as 
well as entertainment formats. Particularly, contests where the audience votes for 
the winner, like for instance Pop Idol, The X Factor, the Eurovision Song Contest 
and others have garnered interest from the sciences (Boorstin 1961; Glejser and 
Heyndels 2001; Ginsburgh and van Ours 2003; Franck and Nüesch 2007). The es-
sential question is about what factors determine the outcome of popular vote mu-
sic contests. Is it really talent or do other factors like, inter alia, appearance, geo-
graphic origin, ethnical and linguistic affinity, or previous/current popularity deter-
mine the outcome? Both theoretical and empirical economic literature has ad-
dressed this phenomenon. The latter has especially focused on the Eurovision Song 
Contest because it is often perceived as symbolic for preferences of countries or 
political and other non-talent dimensions rather than music preferences. These pa-
pers establish empirical evidence for biased voting behavior, which is based on ge-
ographical and cultural closeness as well as performance (e.g. order effects), lin-
guistic and religious factors (inter alia Fenn et al. 2006; Ginsburgh and Noury 2008; 
Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009; Budzinski and Pannicke 2016; Pannicke 2016; Haan 
et al. 20051). However, one factor that is emphasized by the economic theory of 
stardom (see section 3) is generally neglected in the empirical literature – namely 
the previous and current popularity of the contestants, be it due to former success 
and fame or due to extensive media presence. The reason is that popularity is diffi-
cult to measure – either due to the format of the contest where (formerly un-
known) everyday people compete (pop idol, X factor, etc.) or due to national dif-
ferences in popularity and difficulties to obtain data in so many countries (Euro-
vision Song Contest). In this paper, we take advantage of a natural experiment in 
Germany, the so-called Bundesvision Song Contest (BSC), a national media event 
and music competition contest where newcomers compete with established artists 
for audience votes2, in order to provide the – to our best knowledge – first empiri-
cal analysis of the influence of different types of popularity on the contest’s out-
                                                          
1 Other relevant papers include, inter alia Clerides and Stengos (2006), Yair (1995) and Kokko 
and Tingvall (2012). 
2 See http://www.spiegel.de/kultur/tv/bundesvision-song-contest-2014-revolverheld-gewinnt-bei-
stefan-raab-a-992865.html 
 
 
3 
 
come.3 The BSC is held per annum and musicians, representing each of the 16 
German states, compete with each other for audience votes according to rules oth-
erwise very similar to the Eurovision Song Contest. Thus, our general research ques-
tion is: Does popularity influence the outcome of popular vote music contests and 
how so? 
 
In order to address our research question, we introduce a novel approach of 
measures for two different concepts of popularity. First, we collected data regard-
ing the artist’s former success, such as single charts and album top 40 hits and 
their total number of weeks in the charts. In doing so, we operationalize the popu-
larity concept explained by MacDonald (1988) in extension of Rosen (1981). Sec-
ond, in line with Adler (1985, 2006), we proxy an artist’s popularity based on press 
publicity like traditional media coverage (newspapers and magazines) and new 
media coverage (websites).  
 
In our analysis, we find empirical evidence that the artist’s ex-ante popularity affect 
the outcome of voting results. While media coverage always positively and signifi-
cantly results in voting bias, former success is less relevant, especially in a longer-
time-period. Thus, we conclude that media presence (Adler-popularity) matters 
more than former success (MacDonald-popularity). 
The paper is structured as follows. While section 2 briefly describes the Bundes-
vision Song Contest, its background and rules, section 3 reviews the relevant litera-
ture on the economic theories of superstars and outlines our hypotheses. Section 4 
forms the main part, containing the econometric analyses and its data description, 
the estimation method and model and controlling variables. Section 5 discuss the 
results as well as summarizes and concludes. 
  
                                                          
3 There is some literature that employs popularity measures like Google hits, Facebook-likes, LexisNexis-hits 
and others in order to analyze whether popularity influences the income of sports stars, for instance in the 
Deutsche Bundesliga (Brandes et al. 2008), National Football League NFL (Treme und Allen 2011) or Na-
tional Basketball Association NBA (Prinz et al. 2012). However, this literature considerably differs as it does 
not aim to explain the outcome of the (in their cases sporting) contests (which would probably also not be 
sensible). 
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2. Bundesvision Song Contest: Background 
The Bundesvision Song Contest is based on the model of the Eurovision Song Con-
test. It is made up of the prefix "Bundes" denoting the Bundesrepublik Deutschland 
and the “-vision Song Contest” in relation to the international Eurovision Song con-
test. The BSC is a national music competition contest where 16 German artists 
compete against each other, who represent the individual 16 German States. The 
BSC was launched by entertainer Stefan Raab, who was inspired by the Eurovision 
Song Contest, in which he also took part as a performer in 2000. The first BSC took 
place on 12 February 2005 in Oberhausen and has been broadcasted by the Ger-
man commercial TV broadcasting company ProSiebenSat.1 since its introduction. 
The BSC ended when Stefan Raab retired from television at the end of 2015. 
 
The main goal of the contest is to select a musician winner. This is decided by a 
public audience (via telephone calls and SMS voting) at the end of the competition 
show. In contrast to the ESC, the audience is allowed for every artist including the 
one representing the resident state of the voter. The scoring system is based on the 
voters in every one of the 16 German State creating their own ranking of the top 
10 performances. The artist who obtains the highest number of votes within an 
individual German State receives twelve points, the second place receives ten and 
the third place will be rewarded with eight points. The performers of the seven fol-
lowing ranks receive decreasingly seven to one points. Nine and eleven points are 
not distributed. Because there are more performers (16) than points to be allocated 
(10 times), six participants receive zero points. In the end, the winner of the contest 
is the artist (and the state she represents) who collected the highest number of 
points.4 
 
Another goal of the program besides entertaining is to support German-language 
music. For this reason at least 50 % of the music lyrics must be sung in German. 
Against this background, the national contest enjoys a good reputation with regard 
to promoting German talents and German-language music as a cultural good. As 
                                                          
4  See http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/. 
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mentioned in the introduction, the producers deliberately select artists so that 
popular stars compete against less well-known newcomers. Musically, there are no 
further restrictions for the participants.5 Analogue to the ESC the winning German 
state of the contest hosts the next BSC. 
 
3. Economic Theory of Superstars and Hypotheses 
The contemporary economic theory of stardom usually refers back to Rosen (1981) 
as the seminal article. He identifies as the principal economic phenomenon of su-
perstars that relatively small differences in talent generate grossly over-proportional 
big differences in income. According to his view, the underlying reason is the im-
perfect substitution of different levels of talent. Lesser talent is a poor substitute for 
greater talent, for instance, “hearing a succession of mediocre singers does not add 
up to a single outstanding performance” (Rosen 1981: 846).  Due to the combina-
tion of imperfect substitution with scale effects, only superstars that dispose over 
superior talent can employ their exceptional talent to reap monopoly rents. Focus-
ing on talent, Rosen (1981) remains silent on the role of popularity, which is why, 
for our purposes, the extension of his model by MacDonald (1988) as well as the 
alternative model by Adler (1985) are highly relevant. 
 
MacDonald Approach 
MacDonald (1988) presents a dynamic model version of Rosen (1981), which ad-
dresses the role of former success for current success. Outcomes are serial correlat-
ed for each artist, whereby first-period reviews enjoy predictive power for second-
period performances. Consumers are risk adverse and prefer known qualities over 
unknown ones. Artists that have either been experienced in the first period or at 
least received positive reviews represent known qualities for further periods, 
whereas newcomers represent unknown qualities. Due to the risk adversity of con-
sumers, past success predetermines future success. 
                                                          
5 See http://www.motorvision.de/unterhaltung/tv/bundesvision-song-contest-online-schauen-
wiederholung-prosieben-2013-bosse-gewinnt-niedersachsen-308363.html; 
http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/. 
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The driving-forces of the model dynamics are informational deficiencies on the side 
of the consumers. Due to the experience good character of the artists’ products, 
consumers can assess music quality only after they have listened to it. The experi-
ence leads to an accumulation of artist-specific knowledge. The inherent dynamics 
of the model, however, imply that artists are not ‘born to be stars’ but instead ‘rise 
to become stars’. Since past achievements gain importance due to the experience 
good character of the artistic goods and the risk adversity of the consumers, entry 
barriers for newcomers emerge. Even with the same level of talent, newcomers will 
yield less success than the well-established incumbent stars. They need extraordi-
nary talent (in excess of the incumbents’ talent) in order to capture the risk-adverse 
consumers’ attention and enter the market.  
 
In summary, we define MacDonald-popularity in terms of former success that pro-
motes future success. One success characteristic that is clearly identifiable and 
measurable are the numbers of sales which reflect in the official music charts 
ranked by sales of singles and full albums, respectively. In our empirical study we, 
therefore, measure this popularity by counting the top 40 single charts hits and the 
top 40 album charts hits of the BSC contestants before the contest took place. Be-
cause past success predetermines future success, we chose to measure a long-term 
period (former success; 5 years before the contest) and a short-term period (current 
success; 6 month before the contest). Against this background, we formulate our 
first hypotheses as follows: 
 
H1: MacDonald-popularity (former and current charts success) significantly and 
positively influences contest outcome. 
 
Adler Approach 
Rosen’s (1981) seminal paper triggered Adler (1985) to develop a different perspec-
tive. Instead (only) due to the artist’s talent superstars may predominantly attract 
fans by their high profile and celebrity status (see also Boorstin 1961; Franck and 
Nüesch 2007). Adler’s theoretical approach is based on the ‘consumption capital’ 
model of Stigler and Becker (1977). For example, if consumers examined a certain 
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type of music very closely in the past, they are more likely to be in the position to 
value and appreciate this type of music in the present. They gained knowledge and 
accumulated ‘consumption capital, that qualifies them to derive more enjoyment 
and utility by consuming this type of music: "[T] he more you know the more you 
enjoy" (Adler 1985, 208-209). 
 
Adler (1985), therefore, emphasizes that the accumulation of star-specific ‘con-
sumption capital’ is decisive: the more consumers know about the art and the art-
ist, the more enjoyment they derive from consuming more art of this type or re-
spectively more from this artist (also known as the bandwagon effect: Leibenstein 
1950). The accumulation of star-specific knowledge increases the marginal utility of 
consumption, because consumers are able to appreciate the art and the artist. Ad-
ler (1985) explains three ways of accumulation ‘consumption capital’: First, expo-
sure to the art itself (Stigler and Becker 1977), second, through discussions about 
the art with friends and acquaintances (‘discussing consumption’), and third, 
through media coverage of the art/artist (Adler 2006). According to Adler, the only 
costs emerging for consumers by consuming the art is time. He divides the costs of 
time into ‘actual time’ (direct consumption and / or discussion with other individu-
als) and the time for searching suitable conversational partners (Adler 1985: 209). 
In order to minimize searching costs the consumer chooses the most famous artist, 
because there are more information available and more knowledgeable conversa-
tional partners to find. “When the artist is popular, it is easier to find discussants 
who are familiar with her or to find media coverage about her. This is why con-
sumers prefer to consume what others also consume” (Adler 2006: 898). The re-
sults are positive network externalities that create path-dependency and snowball 
effects, since every consumer maximize its marginal utility by joining the majority 
and preferring the same artist. The more members the network has, the higher the 
probability of finding a suitable conversation partner. Media-driven presence sup-
port the artist’s popularity by circulating and enhancing the flow of information 
(Adler 2006) as well as the so-called mere exposure effect, which is a psychological 
phenomenon by which individuals have a tendency to favour and positively value 
individuals or stimuli simply because they are exposed to it repetitively (inter alia 
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Bornstein 1989; Zajonc 1968, 2001; Moreland and Zajonc 1982; Olivola and Todo-
rov 2010).6  
 
In summary, while MacDonald-popularity relies on past success, popularity of the 
Adler-type predominantly rests on media presence, largely irrespective of its con-
tent. Accordingly, we define Adler-popularity in terms of presence in traditional 
and new media coverage. To identify the Adler-popularity effect, we measure a per-
former’s popularity by counting their ex-ante presence in German newspapers, 
magazines as well as in websites. We formulate our second hypotheses as follows: 
H2: Adler-popularity (traditional and new media coverage) significantly and posi-
tively influences contest outcome. 
 
4. Econometric Analyses  
4.1 Estimation Model and Dependent Variable 
In order to test our hypothesis, we conduct an empirical study. We use the com-
plete historical voting data set of the BSC voting data from its beginnings in 2005 
until 20157. The voting results are all published by the company ProSiebenSat.1 on 
an official website for every year. These voting results represent the number of 
points the voters in each German state awarded every artist of the contest each 
year. In each BSC, all German states compete. We tabulated the points given from 
each German State to each artist for every single year. In total we get 2,816 obser-
vations, which amount to 176 observations per German State.  
 
We test our hypotheses of popularity affecting the outcome of voting results 
through our data model. Our data set consists of three dimensions, which are year 
= time (t), juries = state A and the performer/artist of another state B.  
 
We define our dependent variable as the awarded POINTSABt from state A to the 
artist B per year within the whole period from 2005-2015. We treat POINTSABt as a 
                                                          
6 For example, Gaissmaier and Marewski (2011) showed in their study that those politicians with 
a high press coverage are more likely to win elections because they were made more familiar to 
their voters. 
7 See http://tvtotal.prosieben.de/tvtotal/specials/bundesvision-song-contest/. 
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continuous dependent variable instead of a categorical one like the final ranking. 
For that reason, we estimate the equation by linear methods (OLS) (Haan et al. 
2005) as well as taking into account state-fixed effects after running a Hausman 
test comparing fixed with random effects and against the background of Euro-
vision and Bundesvision Song Contest literature (inter alia Budzinski and Pannicke 
2016; Ginsburgh and Noury 2008; Pannicke 2016). 
 
Accordingly, we define 𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 as the dependent variable: 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡 = a + βPopularityB,t + XAB,t   + εAB,t  
 
where 
 
𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝑃𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴,𝑡𝑡  = represents the number of points given by voters of state A to 
artist B in year t,  
α   = intercept 
βPopularityB,t = the corresponding popularity by artist B in year t,  
εAB,t  = error term 
and XAB,t  includes corresponding control variables. 
 
4.2 Variable Description and Descriptive Statistics 
The literature on media and cultural economics addresses a relevant number of 
empirical studies that have focused their research on voting behavior and voting 
biases in the Eurovision Song Contest (inter alia Fenn et al. 2006; Budzinski and 
Pannicke 2016; Haan et al. 2005; Ginsburgh and Noury 2008; Yair 1995). For that 
reason, we take into account control variables and divide our independent variables 
into 3 different categories (Schweiger and Brosius 2003): 
I. Artist’s popularity (press coverage, chart-positions, newcomers vs. in-
cumbent artists in Germany) 
II. Performance characteristics of the musical piece (inter alia, gender of the 
performer, order, type of formation) and 
10 
 
III. Relations between the federal German States (geographical and cultural 
closeness, confession). 
 
I. Artist’s  Popularity 
Because we define MacDonald-popularity in terms of former success that promotes 
future success, we collected the total number of official top 40 Charts ranked by 
single and full album sales as well as their total number of weeks within these 
charts8 before the contest took place. We consider two periods of time. First, we 
collected every top 40 single (Hits lt) and album hits (Album lt) including their total 
number of weeks (weeks Hits lt and weeks Album lt) 5 years before the artists per-
formed at the contest (long-term period). Second, we chose a short-term period of 
6 month in order to measure short-term effects (st)9. 
 
In line with Adler (2006), popularity is strongly associated with media presence. In 
order to identify Adler-popularity, we include the performer’s popularity as a proxy 
by counting how often all of the participants were mentioned with their band or 
stage name at least once in the media coverage. Due to the ambiguity of some of 
the band’s names like “Blumentopf” (‘flowerpot’), “TipTop”, “Ich kann fliegen” (‘I 
can fly’), “Duerer” and so on, we could not obtain reliable data for them since it 
was impossible to disentangle the results without looking into each single hit. 
Thus, we excluded these bands and, consequently, the number of observations 
drops from 2,816 to 2,576 (LexisNexis database) and 2,591 (Factiva database). 
 
The data bases on traditional media publicity was collected by using both LexisNex-
is (e.g. Franck and Nüesch 2012; Brandes et al. 2008) and Factiva databases. The 
databases LexisNexis and Factiva provide worldwide press information and nation-
wide content of various daily and weekly German newspapers (such as Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Zeitung, Die Welt am Sonntag, Hamburger Morgenpost, Mitteldeutsche 
Zeitung, Die Welt, Der Tagesspiegel, taz, Thüringer Allgemeine, etc.) as well as 
German magazines and journals (including Der Spiegel, Bild, Stern, Bunte, etc.) and 
                                                          
8  he data was collected on: https://www.offiziellecharts.de/. 
9 Regarding the top 40 album charts hits of the BSC contestants, the variable turns out to be de 
facto a dummy-variable, because the maximum number top 40 album charts hits is 1.  
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German web-based publications (for example Echo online, rtl, tagesschau, Yahoo! 
Deutschland: Schlagzeilen, etc.). Factiva has more than 500 German source titles in 
total; LexisNexis more than 240 in total. While LexisNexis mainly provides data in 
the range of traditional media coverage as magazines and newspapers, Factiva has 
predominantly, beside newspapers and magazines, web-based publications. We 
searched for the name of the participating band in a long- and short-term period 
right before broadcasting the contest. For the short-term period we chose the same 
time span of 6 month before the contest took place. For the long-term period a 5-
year laps of time. Referring to Prinz et al. (2012) as well as Garcia‐del‐Barrio and 
Pujol (2007), we also collected Google-hits of every band as a third variable for 
popularity in order to measure only their entire internet presence. We gathered the 
total number of links counted by the search engine Google when searching for the 
band’s name. Likewise, we separated into a long (5 years) and a short-term (6 
month) period. We would have liked to include measures like Facebook-likes as well 
but, unfortunately, historical data was not available. 
 
In order to get a first descriptive impression on a potential influence of popularity 
and received points, we display the top 5 artists with the highest and lowest total 
number of points within the whole period of 11 years in tables 1 and 2. While table 
1 shows the top 5 and bottom 5 and their MacDonald-popularity variables (al-
bums- and single-charts success), table 3 illustrates those top 5 and bottom 5 in 
combination with their Alder-popularity variables (media presence). 
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Table 1: Top and bottom 5 artists (MacDonald-popularity) 
Artist Points 
Hits  
st 
Weeks 
Hits st 
Album 
st 
Weeks 
Album st 
Hits 
lt 
Weeks 
Hits lt 
Album 
lt 
Weeks 
Album lt 
Top 5 artists 
         Revolverheld  180 1 11 1 9 1 11 1 9 
Peter Fox 174 2 39 1 18 2 41 1 19 
XAVAS 172 1 3 0 0 1 4 0 0 
Mark Forster 170 2 30 1 25 4 126 1 57 
Unheilig 164 2 43 1 25 2 52 3 71 
Bottom 5 artists 
        Mellow Mark feat. 
Nina Maleika 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Guaia Guaia 8 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
AK4711 6 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Bernd Begemann/ 
Dirk Darmstaedter 4 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
Wunderkynd 2 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
 
It can be seen that every artist of the top 5 performer had at least one top 40 single 
hit, while none of the bottom 5 has a top 40 hit before the respective contest took 
place. Similarly, in respect to full albums ranked within top 40 charts, only the band 
XAVAS had no album success among the top 5, while none of the artists of the 
bottom 5 had any top 40 album success before participating in the BSC. 
 
Table 2: Top and bottom 5 artists (Adler-popularity) 
Artist Points 
Lexis 
Nexis lt 
Lexis 
Nexis st 
Factiva 
lt 
Factiva 
st 
Google  
lt 
Google  
st 
Top 5 artists 
       Revolverheld  180 151 45 185 102 3140 492 
Peter Fox 174 186 168 183 166 36400 1940 
XAVAS 172 1000 465 3685 587 4150 8670 
Mark Forster 170 626 335 1015 544 203000 32300 
Unheilig 164 495 342 512 337 24600 7020 
Bottom 5 artists 
       Mellow Mark feat. 
Nina Maleika 8 72 23 151 53 1550 203 
Guaia Guaia 8 168 161 121 107 966 333 
AK4711 6 22 17 35 31 95 37 
Bernd Begemann 
& Dirk Darmstaed-
ter 4 544 48 723 63 24 411 
Wunderkynd 2 6 3 7 4 1500 410 
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Similarly, it can be seen that the top 5 artists were much more often mentioned in 
press and publicity than the bottom 5 performers before they appeared in the con-
test.  
 
Our selection of control variables is based on intensive literature research concern-
ing the ESC. First, we consider performance characteristics (II) and second, different 
relations between the German States (III). 
 
II. Performance Characteristics (Control Variables)  
We define control variables that characterize performance features such as gender 
(male, female) of the artist and the formation divided into a group, a (male-) soloist 
or a duo (male-male, male-female or female-female) formation. Because Haan et al. 
(2005) find evidence for a systematic order influence on the final results in the ESC, 
we include an opening-dummy-variable and an order-variable. These variables mir-
ror the order of acts in which the participating states are viewed by the public au-
dience and if the song was the first performed song. Moreover, we include a host- 
dummy for showing if the performing state is the host state of the contest. Be-
sides, due to the fact that ten artists performed twice under the same stage name, 
we also include a dummy-variable for same artist if the artists have already partici-
pated in the contest years before.  
 
III. Geographical and Cultural Distortions (Control Variables)  
Lazarsfeld et al. (1948: 137) conclude in their research: “voting is essentially a 
group experience. People who work or live or play together are likely to vote for the 
same candidates“. In line with this, literature on the Eurovision Song Contest found 
geographical influence on the voting behavior (Yair 1995; Gatherer 2004). At first 
sight, one may think that this should not be relevant for a national music contest. 
However, Budzinski and Pannicke (2016) found that geographical and cultural ef-
fects matter for the BSC as well. Thus, we gather data about geographical closeness 
of the Federal Republic of Germany. We include a dummy variable for neighboring 
German states by showing if state A and state of artist B share a common border 
(Spierdijk and Vellekoop 2009). Furthermore, we complement the geographical var-
14 
 
iable by collecting the length of common border in km and the total distance be-
tween the capitals of each German State10. We also generate a dummy variable if 
the German State of artist B was a former Eastern part of Germany or not. Fur-
thermore, we control for patriotic voting, i.e. voting for an artist from the voter’s 
home state.  
 
Ginsburgh and Noury (2008) used Hofstede’s four cultural dimensions in order to 
find a relation between the cultural diversity among the participants representing 
different countries (Hofstede 1980, 1991). Because Hofstede’s cultural dimensions 
are not available for the several German states, we consider the Big Five personality 
traits, based on the Five Factor Model (FFM) (Costa and McCrae 1992), which are 
correlated to the Hofstede’s cultural dimensions (McCrae and Terracciano 2005; 
Migliore 2011; Hofstede and McCrae 2004; McCrae 2001). They are defined as "di-
mensions of individual differences in tendencies to show consistent patterns of 
thoughts, feelings, and actions" (McCrae and Costa 1990: 29) and consist of Neu-
roticism, Extraversion, and Openness to Experience, Agreeableness and Conscien-
tiousness (McCrae and John 1992).11 Consequently, we include the regional values 
of the personality traits for each German State and create 5 different variables as a 
proxy for cultural closeness.12  
 
Research of behavioral economics emphasize a relationship of the religion and eco-
nomic agents’ decisions (Iannacconea 1998; Kuran 1994). Against this background, 
we generate a dummy variable for confession, if state A and state B share the same 
confession. We differentiate between Catholics, Protestants and those who have no 
religious affiliations. We consider those religious denominations, if the percentage 
of members is not less than 40 percent. 
 
 
                                                          
10 www.worldatlas.com/aatlas/findlatlong.html. 
11 A high value in Neuroticism refers to a high share of easily depressed and anxious individuals 
and a low share of extroverted personalities (which are very sociable and talkative), while 
Openness to Experience stands for creativity, artistic skills and unconventional human beings. 
The Agreeableness factor represents compassion, corporation, and trust, while Conscientious-
ness is characterized by planned and organized behavior (Atkinson et al. 2000). 
12 We obtained the dataset from the German Socio-Economic Panel Study (SOEP). 
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Table 3: Descriptive Statistics and Description for all Variables 
Variable Description Obs Mean Std. 
Dev. 
Min Max 
Dependent Variab-
le 
      
Points Number of points given by voters of 
state A to artist B in year t 
2816 3.617.89
8 
385.551 0 12 
       
Independent Variables      
MacDonald- popularity     
Hits st13 Number of Top 40 Hits, short term  2816 .2784091 .580845 0 2 
weeks Hits st Number of Weeks, Top 40 Hits, 
short term 
2816 3.306.81
8 
863.005 0 50 
Albums st Number Albums Top 40, short term 2816 .2553267 .4361221 0 1 
weeks Albums st Number of weeks, Album Top 40, 
short term 
2816 2.861.50
6 
6.943.61
9 
0 49 
Hits lt14 Number of Top 40 Hits, long term 2816 .6917614 1.340.77
3 
0 7 
weeks Hits lt Number of Weeks, Top 40 Hits, long 
term 
2816 1.052.87
6 
2.344.23
8 
0 132 
Albums lt  Number Albums Top 40, long term 2816 .6352983 .9548328 0 5 
weeks Albums lt Number of weeks, Album Top 40, 
long term 
2816 863.956 165.936 0 79 
 
Adler- popularity 
     
LexisNexis lt media presence by Lexis Nexis 
(mainly newspaper and magazines), 
long-term 
2592 1.960.77
6 
3.582.91
4 
0 2952 
LexisNexis st media presence by Lexis Nexis 
(mainly newspaper and magazines), 
short-term 
2592 5.444.86
9 
9.773.38
4 
0 750 
Factiva lt media presence by Factiva (mainly 
websites), long-term 
2592 2.866.45
1 
5.729.91
5 
0 4377 
Factiva st media presence by Factiva (mainly 
websites), short-term 
2592 8.129.86
1 
1.331.38
8 
0 900 
GoogleHits lt total number of links counted by 
the search engine Google. Long-
term 
2816 13181.47 52281.43 0 501000 
GoogleHits st total number of links counted by 
the search engine Google, short-
term 
2816 1.283.76
6 
3.420.36
5 
0 32300 
       
Control Variables       
Performance characteristics       
OpeningBt If artist B was the first performance 
in year t = 1, Otherwise = 0 
2816 .0625 .2421045 0 1 
OrderBt Order of artists B in year t (one for 
the first performing song) 
2816 8.501.06
5 
4.611.36
1 
1 16 
GroupBt If artist B´s song was sung by a 
group in year t = 1, Otherwise = 0 
2816 .5791903 .4937767 0 1 
DuetBt If artist B´s song was sung by a 2816 .0568182 .231536 0 1 
                                                          
13 Short-term = 6 month. 
14 Long-term = 5 years. 
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female-male, male-male or female-
female duet in year t = 1 
Male_soloBt If artist B´s song was sung by a 
male soloist in year t = 1, Other-
wise = 0 
2816 .2677557 .4428682 0 1 
HostBt If artist B was from the host state in 
year t = 1, Otherwise = 0 
2816 .0625 .2421045 0 1 
Same Artist If artists B already performed in the 
contest in year t-1 =1, Otherwise = 
0 
2816 .0564631     .2308547           0 1 
 
Relations between States  
     
Geography       
FormerGDRB If artist B was performing for a for-
mer Eastern part of Germany = 1 
Otherwise = 0 
2816 .3125 .4635947 0 1 
NeighbAB If state B and  state A are neighbors 
= 1, Otherwise = 0 
2816 .2151989 .4110332 0 1 
Length_CBAB Length of common border in km of 
state A and state B  
2816 5.384.16
2 
1.278.09
2 
0 829 
Capital_DisAB Distance between capitals of state A 
and state B in km 
2816 3.057.78
5 
1.654.46
8 
0 694.82 
Home_BiasAB If states A and state represented by 
artists B are the same German 
States = 1, Otherwise = 0 
2816 .0653409 .2471703 0 1 
       
Religion       
Religion If state A and state B share at the 
minimum one major religion = 1, 
Otherwise = 0 
2816 .3512074 .4774324 0 1 
       
Culture       
ConscientiousnessAB Difference between indices of con-
scientiousness of states A and B 
2816 .122491 .0918847 0 .39285 
OpennessAB Difference between indices of 
openness of states A and B 
2816 .1710218 .1330512 0 .48104 
AgreeablenessAB Difference between indices of 
agreeableness of states A and B 
2816 .0871271 .0877877 0 .37163 
ExtraversionAB Difference between indices of extra-
version of states A and B 
2816 .0900324 .0748044 0 .33745 
NeuroticismAB Difference between indices of neu-
roticism of states A and B 
2816 .1266097 .1117437 0 .516802 
 
To avoid multicollinearity between our independent variables, a variance inflation 
factor (VIF) test was performed. Approximately, statistical estimation is assumed 
unreliable and their variables are highly collinear if the variance inflation factor ex-
ceeds 10. Our VIF tests are substantially lower than 10, except the variable weeks 
albums, which has a VIF value close to 10. For that reason, we separately estimate 
the influence of the variables weeks (albums and weeks hits) and the number of 
top 40 hits and albums. When separating them, all the independent variables have 
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VIF values of less than 10, so collinearity should not pose difficulties (Chaterjee and 
Price 1977). Because of their collinearity, we also put the databases LexisNexis and 
Factiva into separate estimations. 
 
4.3 Results 
The OLS-regression output from different model specifications are presented in-
cluding a variety of combinations of explanatory and control variables in tables 4-7. 
Model I to IV estimate the long-term relationship between MacDonald-popularity, 
Adler-popularity and the number of points given by audience. Model I and II in-
clude the Adler-popularity searched via LexisNexis database, models III and IV via 
database Factiva. Model V to VIII estimate the current-success relationship between 
popularity variables and received points per artist. Likewise, we estimated separate-
ly per databases LexisNexis and Factiva (model V-VI and model VII-VIII). While mod-
els I, III, V and VII include the variable of top 40 hits and top 40 albums, model II, 
IV, VI and VIII include the variable of their total number of weeks (weeks hits and 
weeks album). Our regression output in tables 6 and 7 (appendix) takes into ac-
count state fixed effects with the same model specification as described before. The 
estimation results are remarkably consistent between our models, which underlies 
their robustness.  
 
In general, the outcomes from our OLS-voting model confirm the results by litera-
ture like Budzinski and Pannicke (2016) and Pannicke (2016) to the extent that the 
BSC shows significantly biased voting patterns based on geographical and perfor-
mance proximity (see tables 4-5 and appendix tables 6-7). 
 
The first conclusion we can draw from the analysis for our research focus is that 
popularity does affect the outcome of the BSC. Both the MacDonald-popularity in 
terms of previous success and the Adler- popularity in terms of media presence in 
traditional and new media coverage significantly and positively influence the con-
test’s outcome. In general terms, our hypotheses H1 and H2 are supported. Not-
withstanding, a closer look reveals some interesting details. 
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Focusing on the model specifications that include short-term variables (table 5, 
models V – VIII), we find statistically significant support for our first hypotheses to 
the extent that the MacDonald-popularity in terms of current charts success signifi-
cantly and positively influences the contest outcome. Every variable turns out to be 
positive and significant. An interesting case surfaces when looking at the long-term 
variables in terms of former charts success. While the number of former top 40 al-
bums, their number of weeks in the charts (model I and III) and the number of top 
40 hits (model III) significantly and positively influence the outcome, the total 
number of weeks of a single chart hit show a significant negative influence. In oth-
er words, while success in the last five years is generally boosting performance in 
the contest, this is significantly not true for artists that scored a low number of top 
40 singles hits, which had a long duration in the charts, and low album success. 
Although this seems paradoxical, the phenomena of a so-called ‘one-hit-wonder’ 
may be a specific explanation, where an artist achieves (huge) temporary success 
and popularity solely for exactly one hit and quickly fades in popularity thereafter 
(and does not achieve any comparable success with follow-up songs). This phe-
nomenon should indeed be more prevalent in the singles charts than in the album 
charts.  
 
Moreover, we find strong support for our second hypotheses in every specification 
(except Google Hits lt, model I). Adler-popularity both in terms of current and for-
mer media presence significantly and positively influences the contest outcome. 
The variables Google Hits st, media presence by Lexis Nexis (mainly newspaper and 
magazines) and media presence by Factiva (mainly websites) turn out to be positive 
and significant in every single model. 
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Table 4: OLS-estimations Results, Long-term 
 I II III IV 
Variables Model Model Model Model 
Opening 1.305*** 1.199*** 1.181*** 1.069*** 
 (4.89) (4.50) (4.43) (4.03) 
     
Order 0.290*** 0.274*** 0.280*** 0.264*** 
 (19.80) (18.56) (19.04) (17.83) 
     
Group 1.236*** 0.911*** 1.218*** 0.882*** 
 (6.24) (4.53) (6.17) (4.41) 
     
Duet 0.831** 0.430 0.819** 0.406 
 (2.81) (1.46) (2.78) (1.39) 
     
Male_solo 1.486*** 1.254*** 1.470*** 1.231*** 
 (7.03) (5.90) (6.99) (5.82) 
     
FormerGDR 0.236 0.180 0.219 0.165 
 (1.79) (1.38) (1.67) (1.27) 
     
Home_Bias 6.355*** 6.412*** 6.318*** 6.378*** 
 (19.82) (20.08) (19.79) (20.07) 
     
Host -0.643** -0.554* -0.557* -0.473 
 (-2.62) (-2.27) (-2.28) (-1.95) 
     
Religion -0.00962 -0.00551 -0.0203 -0.0173 
 (-0.07) (-0.04) (-0.14) (-0.12) 
     
Capital DisAB -0.00397*** -0.00386*** -0.00407*** -0.00395*** 
 (-7.87) (-7.67) (-8.08) (-7.89) 
     
Neighb. 0.405 0.435 0.405 0.438 
 (1.62) (1.75) (1.63) (1.77) 
     
Length_CB -0.000656 -0.000641 -0.000751 -0.000739 
 (-0.87) (-0.85) (-1.00) (-0.99) 
     
Same Artist -0.806** -0.466 -0.838** -0.503 
 (-3.00) (-1.74) (-3.13) (-1.89) 
     
Conscientiousness 0.530 0.940 0.436 0.849 
 (0.74) (1.31) (0.61) (1.19) 
     
Openness 0.568 0.561 0.663 0.662 
 (1.10) (1.09) (1.29) (1.29) 
     
Agreeableness -1.663 -1.886* -1.725 -1.943* 
 (-1.76) (-2.01) (-1.83) (-2.08) 
     
Extraversion -0.272 -0.428 -0.411 -0.578 
 (-0.26) (-0.41) (-0.40) (-0.56) 
     
Neuroticism 0.118 0.0675 0.144 0.0968 
 (0.22) (0.12) (0.26) (0.18) 
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LexisNexis lt 0.00132*** 0.00120***   
 (7.37) (6.71)   
     
GoogleHits lt15 0.00500** 0.00558*** 0.00536*** 0.00582*** 
 (3.21) (3.56) (3.52) (3.79) 
     
Album lt 0.657***  0.657***  
 (8.82)  (8.88)  
     
Hits lt 0.0774  0.0726  
 (1.51)  (1.43)  
     
Weeks Album lt  0.0626***  0.0637*** 
  (10.06)  (10.36) 
     
Weeks Hits lt  -0.0184***  -0.0197*** 
  (-4.25)  (-4.56) 
     
Factiva lt   0.00115*** 0.00111*** 
   (8.72) (8.42) 
     
_cons -0.0781 0.409 0.0388 0.527 
 (-0.21) (1.11) (0.11) (1.44) 
N 2592 2592 2592 2592 
 
Table 5: OLS-estimations Results, Short-term 
 V  VI VII VIII 
Variables Model   Model  Model  Model  
Opening 1.052***  1.110*** 1.028*** 1.082*** 
 (4.00)  (4.16) (3.89) (4.05) 
      
Order 0.255***  0.255*** 0.256*** 0.256*** 
 (17.29)  (16.83) (17.40) (16.93) 
      
Group 1.332***  1.145*** 1.361*** 1.179*** 
 (6.76)  (5.69) (6.93) (5.89) 
      
Duet 0.838**  0.498 0.861** 0.525 
 (2.88)  (1.69) (2.97) (1.79) 
      
Male_solo 1.349***  1.188*** 1.356*** 1.198*** 
 (6.36)  (5.55) (6.40) (5.60) 
      
FormerGDR 0.212  0.131 0.198 0.117 
 (1.65)  (1.00) (1.54) (0.90) 
      
Home_Bias 6.408***  6.451*** 6.387*** 6.428*** 
 (20.31)  (20.20) (20.24) (20.12) 
      
Host -0.233  -0.423 -0.194 -0.381 
 (-0.96)  (-1.73) (-0.80) (-1.56) 
      
                                                          
15 For each 1000th Google-Hit. 
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Religion_Dummy 0.0302  0.00399 0.0262 -0.000630 
 (0.21)  (0.03) (0.19) (-0.00) 
      
Capital_DisAB -0.00388***  -0.00390*** -0.00389*** -0.00392*** 
 (-7.79)  (-7.75) (-7.82) (-7.78) 
      
Neighb 0.423  0.430 0.421 0.429 
 (1.72)  (1.73) (1.72) (1.72) 
      
Length_CB -0.000780  -0.000611 -0.000804 -0.000638 
 (-1.05)  (-0.81) (-1.08) (-0.85) 
      
Same Artist -0.251  0.227 -0.364 0.108 
 (-1.00)  (0.93) (-1.43) (0.44) 
      
Conscientiousness 0.873  1.283 0.907 1.322 
 (1.24)  (1.79) (1.28) (1.85) 
      
Openness 0.640  0.553 0.664 0.580 
 (1.26)  (1.08) (1.31) (1.13) 
      
Agreeableness -1.509  -1.769 -1.647 -1.922* 
 (-1.62)  (-1.88) (-1.77) (-2.05) 
      
Extraversion -0.376  -0.473 -0.472 -0.579 
 (-0.37)  (-0.45) (-0.46) (-0.56) 
      
Neuroticism 0.238  0.283 0.208 0.251 
 (0.44)  (0.52) (0.39) (0.46) 
      
LexisNexis st 0.00341***  0.00373***   
 (4.03)  (4.33)   
      
GoogleHits st 0.0618**  0.0701** 0.0550* 0.0618** 
 (2.75)  (3.09) (2.32) (2.58) 
      
Hits st 0.860***   0.855***  
 (7.18)   (7.14)  
      
Album st 0.939***   0.950***  
 (5.63)   (5.70)  
      
weeksHits st   0.0276*  0.0287* 
   (2.04)  (2.12) 
      
weeksAlbum st   0.0548**  0.0538** 
   (3.21)  (3.16) 
      
Factiva st    0.00265*** 0.00292*** 
    (3.98) (4.33) 
      
_cons 0.0834  0.461 0.0683 0.443 
 (0.23)  (1.25) (0.19) (1.20) 
N 2592  2592 2592 2592 
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5. Discussion and Conclusion 
Altogether, popularity matters for music contests where the audience votes for the 
winner. While this result may not come as a surprise, our paper is the first to pro-
vide empirical evidence on this hypothesis derived from the economic theory of 
stardom. Furthermore, looking into the details of our study reveals some interest-
ing additional results and implications. In order to operationalize the concept of 
popularity, we distinguished two types of popularity (derived from theory): Mac-
Donald-popularity as former musical success (charts hits) and Adler-popularity as 
media presence irrespective of whether it is music (success) related or otherwise. 
Our analysis shows that Adler-popularity is a more important success factor for mu-
sic contests than MacDonald-popularity. In other words, for receiving audience 
votes, it is more important to present in the (traditional and new) media than to 
have been a successful hit artists before. On the one hand, this is good news for 
newcomers who enjoy better chances than MacDonald’s star theory would suggest. 
On the other hand, it indicates that music quality (including musical talent) may 
not be that relevant compared to boulevard effects: radically phrased – being a 
“media-friendly” personality beats being a talented musician. However, this conclu-
sion should be taken with some caution since (so far) none of the discussed stud-
ies, including our own, is able to include an independent variable measuring music 
quality in their estimations. 
 
Our results also reveal an interesting phenomenon regarding the relevance of for-
mer charts success (MacDonald-popularity). Having enjoyed a huge but single 
(song) hit (low number of top 40 hits but long duration) without considerable al-
bum success actually negatively influences success in popular vote music contests in 
our sample. This may reflect the rise and fall of so-called one-hit wonders, artists 
that manage one huge hit but do not manage to follow-up on this single success 
nor to build a fan-base for sustainable success. In these cases, the popularity of the 
hit does not spill-over to the performing artist, so that it does not help her in a sub-
sequent popular vote contest (years later). Quite the contrary, the audience appar-
ently ‘punishes’ the newer efforts of the one-hit wonder. 
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Eventually, our analysis demonstrates that the different types of popularity should 
not be neglected when analyzing success factors of music – be it in contests or in 
more general contexts. This is particularly important, when the popularity of the 
contestants differs considerably among the competing participants. Note that pop-
ularity is likely to matter also for contests among newcomers only (like Pop Idol, 
The X Factor, etc.) since Adler-popularity does not require former success in music. 
Managing to maximize media presence will likely increase wining probabilities. If – 
like in the BSC – newcomers compete with incumbent artists, the media channel 
may actually provide an opportunity for talented newcomers to overcome the 
MacDonald-popularity deficit to (ceteris paribus) similar talented incumbents.  
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Appendix: 
 
Table 6: OLS by fixed effects (states), long-term   
 I II III IV 
Variables Model  Model  Model  Model  
Opening 1.343*** 1.258*** 1.181*** 1.094*** 
 (4.88) (4.58) (4.30) (4.00) 
     
Order 0.261*** 0.247*** 0.249*** 0.235*** 
 (17.35) (16.33) (16.53) (15.53) 
     
Group 1.185*** 0.907*** 1.147*** 0.860*** 
 (6.01) (4.54) (5.85) (4.33) 
     
Duet 0.729* 0.423 0.712* 0.395 
 (2.46) (1.44) (2.42) (1.35) 
     
Male_solo 1.592*** 1.381*** 1.559*** 1.345*** 
 (7.49) (6.47) (7.38) (6.35) 
     
FormerGDR 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Home_Bias 6.423*** 6.440*** 6.431*** 6.449*** 
 (20.08) (20.22) (20.24) (20.39) 
     
Host -1.087*** -1.084*** -1.000*** -1.006*** 
 (-4.30) (-4.31) (-3.99) (-4.04) 
     
Religion 0.0934 0.0930 0.0916 0.0911 
 (0.66) (0.66) (0.65) (0.65) 
     
Capital_DisAB -0.00303*** -0.00301*** -0.00302*** -0.00300*** 
 (-5.75) (-5.74) (-5.77) (-5.76) 
     
Neighb 0.435 0.439 0.438 0.442 
 (1.73) (1.75) (1.75) (1.78) 
     
Length_CB -0.000377 -0.000372 -0.000380 -0.000375 
 (-0.50) (-0.50) (-0.51) (-0.50) 
     
Same Artist -0.554* -0.253 -0.597* -0.286 
 (-2.06) (-0.95) (-2.23) (-1.08) 
     
Conscientiousness 1.068 1.078 1.073 1.085 
 (1.42) (1.44) (1.44) (1.46) 
     
Openness -0.0562 -0.0510 -0.0530 -0.0474 
 (-0.11) (-0.10) (-0.10) (-0.09) 
     
Agreeableness -1.019 -1.018 -1.015 -1.015 
 (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.99) (-0.99) 
     
Extraversion 0.484 0.493 0.485 0.494 
 (0.45) (0.46) (0.45) (0.46) 
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Neuroticism -2.066** -2.063*** -2.065*** -2.062*** 
 (-3.29) (-3.30) (-3.31) (-3.32) 
     
LexisNexis lt 0.00154*** 0.00141***   
 (8.58) (7.87)   
     
GoogleHits lt 0.00686*** 0.00728*** 0.00716*** 0.00749*** 
 (4.32) (4.55) (4.61) (4.81) 
     
Album lt 0.637***  0.638***  
 (8.33)  (8.41)  
     
Hits lt 0.0340  0.0359  
 (0.65)  (0.70)  
     
Weeks Album lt  0.0585***  0.0597*** 
  (9.36)  (9.69) 
     
Weeks Hits lt  -0.0179***  -0.0193*** 
  (-4.11)  (-4.44) 
     
Factiva lt   0.00138*** 0.00132*** 
   (10.40) (9.96) 
     
_cons 0.0845 0.543 0.157 0.620 
 (0.23) (1.51) (0.44) (1.74) 
N 2592 2592 2592 2592 
 
Table 7: OLS by fixed effects (states), short-term  
 V VI VII VIII 
Variables Model  Model  Model  Model  
Opening 0.907*** 0.934*** 0.856** 0.877** 
 (3.34) (3.42) (3.15) (3.21) 
     
Order 0.214*** 0.209*** 0.214*** 0.209*** 
 (14.01) (13.50) (14.09) (13.57) 
     
Group 1.186*** 1.073*** 1.193*** 1.082*** 
 (6.02) (5.41) (6.08) (5.48) 
     
Duet 0.655* 0.387 0.648* 0.384 
 (2.25) (1.33) (2.23) (1.32) 
     
Male_solo 1.228*** 1.115*** 1.215*** 1.105*** 
 (5.77) (5.22) (5.72) (5.19) 
     
FormerGDR 0 0 0 0 
 (.) (.) (.) (.) 
     
Home_Bias 6.378*** 6.406*** 6.386*** 6.415*** 
 (20.33) (20.33) (20.37) (20.38) 
     
Host -0.682** -0.956*** -0.665** -0.935*** 
 (-2.72) (-3.85) (-2.66) (-3.77) 
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Religion 0.0898 0.0882 0.0884 0.0867 
 (0.64) (0.63) (0.63) (0.62) 
     
Capital_DisAB -0.00304*** -0.00302*** -0.00303*** -0.00301*** 
 (-5.89) (-5.83) (-5.88) (-5.82) 
     
Neighb 0.434 0.440 0.437 0.442 
 (1.76) (1.78) (1.77) (1.79) 
     
Length_CB -0.000406 -0.000400 -0.000408 -0.000403 
 (-0.55) (-0.54) (-0.55) (-0.54) 
     
Same Artist -0.0698 0.395 -0.220 0.237 
 (-0.27) (1.64) (-0.86) (0.97) 
     
Conscientiousness 1.027 1.050 1.035 1.059 
 (1.40) (1.42) (1.41) (1.43) 
     
Openness -0.0606 -0.0530 -0.0575 -0.0495 
 (-0.12) (-0.10) (-0.11) (-0.10) 
     
Agreeableness -0.985 -0.989 -0.986 -0.990 
 (-0.97) (-0.97) (-0.98) (-0.98) 
     
Extraversion 0.427 0.444 0.431 0.448 
 (0.40) (0.42) (0.41) (0.42) 
     
Neuroticism -2.100*** -2.089*** -2.097*** -2.085*** 
 (-3.41) (-3.38) (-3.41) (-3.38) 
     
LexisNexis st 0.00382*** 0.00385***   
 (4.50) (4.48)   
     
GoogleHits st 0.0960*** 0.111*** 0.0760** 0.0883*** 
 (4.24) (4.91) (3.15) (3.66) 
     
Hits st 0.683***  0.661***  
 (5.60)  (5.41)  
     
Album st 1.071***  1.070***  
 (6.08)  (6.09)  
     
weeksHits st  0.00345  0.00318 
  (0.26)  (0.24) 
     
weeksAlbum st  0.0878***  0.0867*** 
  (5.21)  (5.15) 
     
Factiva st   0.00347*** 0.00357*** 
   (5.10) (5.19) 
     
_cons 0.590 0.892* 0.552 0.848* 
 (1.67) (2.50) (1.56) (2.38) 
N 2592 2592 2592 2592 
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